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Harry Benda has characterized theorizing about post-inde­
pendence Indonesia as "essentially presenting us highly sophis­
ticated and persuasive answers to an intrinsically mistaken, or 
irrelevant, question."1 Although, as we shall see, his own 
analysis shares the same basic failings found in those he cri­
ticizes, his complaint is well taken. Those who have attempted 
solutions to the problem of making sense of the last twenty years 
of Indonesian history have failed, by and large, to see beyond 
the surface phenomena. They find themselves so absorbed by the 
intricacies of parliamentary politics that most of their time 
is spent in the sorting out of month-to-month maneuvers in 
cabinet and parliament. This failure to penetrate to the 
essentials of a problem, it must be emphasized, cannot be 
attributed to lack of intelligence, integrity, or scholarship. 
Rather the source of the difficulty must be located in the basic 
perspective from which such analysts operate. The specific ap­
proach which a theorist adopts defines not only the character of 
his analysis but the questions which he poses and, equally, the 
questions he does not pose. If the questions are posed incor­
rectly, the analysis will be incapable of explaining the 
phenomena under study.
All attempts to analyze the Indonesian political system 
from within , by accepting the social structure which forms its 
underpinning as given, must share in the irrationality of that 
system. In other words, if the social groups, and classes, 
which hold political and economic power use that power to ob­
struct rather than to facilitate progress, then the social system 
which they dominate is irrational. History has its own internal 
logic in the sense that it displays objective laws of development. 
Mental processes should reflect this objective logic. By reject­
ing the laws of historic development, analytic theory ties itself 
down to the "present," becomes incapable of envisioning revolu­
tionary social change, and, in essence, denies the possibility 
of progress. With respect to Indonesia, such theorizing becomes 
totally bound up in what is an essentially retrogressive social 
system. When thinking about the problems generated by such a 
system accepts that system as "given," then that thinking can 
neither understand the social system as an historically-rooted
1. "Democracy in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies, 23, 
No. 3 (May 1964), p. 449.
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6and transitory phenomenon nor allow that solutions to the 
society1s problems must be sought in the transformations of 
the system itself.
The unsatisfactory nature of the available analyses of 
modern Indonesia is particularly discouraging because of the 
immediacy and the seriousness of her problems. The future 
seems Con the surface at least) to hold no solutions to the 
problems of unemployment, poverty, inflation, and political 
instability. The "Constitutional Democracy" of the 1950Ts 
has been gradually transformed into a military dictatorship 
more in line with underlying social realities. The need for 
a theory which can be used to help solve these problems has 
barely begun to be met.
One of the more impressive attempts to explain Indonesian 
politics is that of Herbert Feith.2 His work is concerned 
with accounting for the political instability that plagues 
the entire period since the Revolution. Feith attempts to ex­
plain these events in terms of a cleavage within the Indonesian 
elite. On the one hand was a group of men (associated with 
Hatta) whom he designates as an "administrative" elite. These 
men were particularly involved with the day-to-day concerns of 
running the country and stabilizing the economy. Opposed to 
this group was one designated as "solidarity-makers," led by 
Sukarno. This latter group was more concerned with the symbols 
of the Revolution and the continuing of the Revolution than 
with the administration of the government. The first group 
is seen by Feith as more conservative and Western-oriented as 
well as more efficient and capable than the second. For 
Feith "the history of the period is the story of the political 
failure of the Hatta group of leaders."3 4 Within Indonesia the 
ties of this group were to "non-bureaucratic business"; it 
wanted to conserve what it could of the "modern administrative 
and economic structure" left from the colonial period.
It is in the intra-elite battle between these two groups 
that Feith finds the source of the political instability of the 
period. Yet in accounting for the failure of constitutional 
democracy, he is forced to focus on "factors related to political 
unrest." The source of this unrest lay in the Revolution and 
the groups with which it was associated were outside of the 
elite. The very problems with which the elite was forced to 
deal were (and still are) problems of "how this unrest would 
be handled.tflf
2. Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University, 1962).
3. Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 604.
4. Ibid., p . 606.
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democracy lies in the unrest of groups outside of the elite, it 
lies in a factor external to Feith’s entire theoretical struc­
ture. The problem becomes one of accounting for the existence 
of this unrest and then accounting for its influence on Indonesian 
politics. We make little progress by pointing to the rise of a 
"solidarity-maker" group which exploits this unrest if we do not 
turn our analysis to the historical, social, and economic rela­
tionships between the ruling groups and the masses. The "soli­
darity-maker" group is still a part of the ruling elite and is 
in no basic sense representative of the people.
The uneasiness inherent in an analysis such as the above is 
even more apparent in Daniel Lev’s discussion in his Transition 
to Guided Democracy. In basic structure, the work is quite com­
parable to FeithTs. Again Lev is concerned with a month-by-month 
cataloging of the events in Indonesian political life. Insofar 
as he holds to this approach, his concern is with developments 
within the elite. Yet, perhaps because of the nature of the 
period he has chosen, a new factor, outside of the elite, breaks 
into the analysis. The increasing unrest of the masses, general­
ly associated with (though not identical to) the rise of the 
Communist Party (P.K.I.), forces its way into the political life 
of the elite-run constitutional democracy. It is in large mea­
sure the accessibility of the parliamentary structures to mass 
demands through the electoral mechanism that is responsible for 
their dissolution. The confrontation between the ruling classes 
and the more conscious elements of the masses which forms a 
central theme of Indonesian politics, undermines the whole 
analytical basis of the elite-centered history of Feith and Lev. 
The latter is somewhat more aware of this than is the former. 
Although he fails to dissect the relationship between his elite 
and the masses, it is an essential point of his analysis that 
"communist success in the parliamentary system contributed to 
the eventual replacement of that system by Guided Democracy."5 
Lev’s insight into the relationship of the P.K.I. to the system 
of parliamentary democracy is important because it can form both 
the basis of a more satisfying analysis of Indonesian politics 
and a critique of his own work. It is therefore worthwhile to 
quote him at length:
. . . the P.K.I. threatened not only the other parties,
but the entire social and political order. It was not 
simply that everyone feared that the communists, once 
in power, would overthrow the existing political 
organization, eliminate the old elite, and invoke their 
own exclusive ideology. That clearly was the crux of 
the matter, but it cannot be too strongly emphasized
5. Daniel Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 19 6 6)”, p. 75.
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be matched by any of the other parties, by the army, or 
even (in organizational terms) by President Sukarno. .
. . By containing the truly radical P.K.I., the elite
whom it challenged, both party and nonparty, was able 
tcj> maintain its hopes for the future. It is important 
tcpj point out that this elite did in fact remain in 
power under Guided Democracy and that it did so by 
shifting away from a broader electoral basis of politics 
towards a narrower and more traditional elite basis.6
The increasing popularity of the P.K.I., while by no means identi 
cal with the unrest of the masses, is a strong indication and 
reflection of the strength of that unrest.
At this point, it is important to see that the discussion 
thus far has brought the approach of Feith and Lev into serious 
question. If post-independence developments are best understood 
in terms of an increasing threat to elite power by a disaffected 
mass, then the key historical problems focus around the nature 
of Indonesian social structure itself and the sources of unrest 
in the Indonesian political economy. Yet, the two discussions 
cited above are more concerned with developments on the purely 
political level than with the underlying problems of the politi­
cal economy.
Before elaborating this critique, it will be instructive 
to turn to some of the economic theory available to students 
of contemporary Indonesia.
We might begin with the least satisfactory kind of analysis- 
that which sees political and economic factors as basically 
independent, though having important influences on each other. 
Such an analysis allows political questions into its theorizing 
only in the very crude sense of political instability creating 
economic instability. Although "economic conditions . . . have
had much to do with aggravating deep-seated political tensions," 
tensions which are "associated with the general social revolu­
tion," nonetheless, basically, "Indonesian experience in 1957 
and 1958 presents an almost classic example of the economic rami­
fications of political instability."7 By ignoring the unity of 
economics and politics, Douglas Paauw provides a striking 
example of an analytical theory which partakes of the irration­
ality of its subject matter. He sees two fundamental solutions 
to Indonesia1s economic difficulties: reduction of inflation­
s' Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 171.
7. Douglas S. Paauw, "The High Cost of Political Instability in 
Indonesia," in Vlekke, Indonesia1s Struggle (The Hague: 
Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1959), p. 23.
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curious fact about these "solutions” is that they are mutually 
exclusive, given the present structure of the Indonesian polit­
ical economy. If no change comes about in the "mode of utiliza­
tion" of IndonesiaTs economic surplus,9 there will be no other 
indigenous source of financing than inflation, and aggregate 
supply is not likely to increase without government financing. 
Thus PaauwTs solution is no more (and perhaps considerably less) 
than a statement of the problem.
We are presented with an essentially sterile framework of 
analysis: inflation results (in large part) from deficit spend­
ing; deficit spending, in its turn, results both from the lack of 
alternative sources of funds and from the need to meet the 
expenses of political instability itself. Thus, if the unrest 
of the masses is to be eased, economic development is essential, 
and yet outside of inflationary deficit spending, the government 
has no funds from indigenous sources for effective development 
programs.
Here we seem confronted with an insurmountable theoretical 
(and practical) question. It is generally conceived of as a 
"vicious circle."10 There seem to be no sources for financing 
economic development which will not result in political in­
stability which is itself a drain on funds potentially available 
for development. Such funds are used to build armies and civil 
services rather than tractors and factories. A closer examina­
tion, however, should reveal that the knot in which these 
theorists seem tied is one strictly of their own making. There 
is no way out in sight because of the restricted vision of those 
who are looking. To find the source of their problems it is 
necessary to isolate their generally unstated underlying assump­
tions .
In his review of Feithfs book, Harry Benda criticizes Feith 
along these lines. He attempts to bring out the underlying 
assumptions of Feithfs approach which render his results sterile 
and comes upon the following insight:
Most of our questions . . . have hitherto resolved
around a singularly simple, continuing theme best
caricatured by the adage. "What's wrong with Indonesia?"
The answers given to this all pervasive, if usually
8. Paauw, "High Cost of Political Instability," p. 30.
9. For a discussion of the concept of the economic surplus see: 
Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: 
Monthly Review, 1962), ch. 2T
10. See, for example: Paauw, "The High Cost of Political In­
stability," p. 23; and Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided 
Democracy," in Ruth McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: 
H.R.A.F., 1963), p. 409.
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unstated, question vary from author to author, from 
discipline to discipline; but basically they have 
led— with greater or less ingenuity— to the discovery 
of a diabolus ex machina.11
The trouble with this approach, as Benda suggests, is that it 
is unhistorical. Such theorizing is bounded by Western his­
tory. If something has gone wrong then there must be some 
right way in which Indonesia should have developed. In a cer­
tain sense this assertion is undeniable. There must be some­
thing radically unsatisfactory in a country in which social 
disorder, poverty, and violence have been endemic for a good 
deal longer than the twenty odd years since independence. How­
ever the tone in which the question "what went wrong" is 
generally asked tends to deny any structural disease in favor 
of a diabolus ex machina. The basic structure of social rela­
tionships is seen as adequate for the task of pursuing economic 
development and political democracy; therefore, if these 
objectives have not been achieved it is only because the 
individuals in charge have been incapable or uninterested in 
such progress. In other words, this approach accepts the 
social structure as given and finds the major historical 
dynamic not in social groups and classes, but in individuals.12
The alternative Benda presents us for understanding recent 
Indonesian history is a kind of identity crisis on a grand 
scale. In the last twenty years we have witnessed "the 
agonizing, difficult adjustment of Indonesia to its own 
identity. . . .  A selective process of adapting resurgent con­
tinuity to a changing reality."13 14 He contends that the 
colonial period in Indonesia has had little influence on the 
basic continuity of Indonesian history. His argument is that 
in terms of elite structure,1h and in terms of economic change,15 
the influence of the West has been, in a basic sense, super­
ficial.
What Benda succeeds in enforcing is, above all, the re­
orientation of our approach to Indonesian history. In order 
to evaluate and criticize his approach we must clarify the 
relationship between Western imperialism and the course of 
Indonesian history. The connection is much more organic and
11. "Democracy in Indonesia," p. 450.
12. Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 108.
13. "Decolonization in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity
and Change," American Historical Review, 70 (Julv 1965)* 
p. 1072. ~
14. Benda, "Decolonization in Indonesia," pp. 1065-1066.
15. Ibid., p. 1066.
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continuing than Benda realizes. Insofar as the Indonesian Revolu­
tion failed to sever Indonesia's future from the structures and 
laws of development defined by the colonial relationships of 
the past, analysts who ignore colonial relationships and con­
centrate on post-independence politics as if they occurred in 
a vacuum cannot possibly explain what they see. Equally, in­
sofar as the colonial relationship has radically affected the 
character of Indonesian society, analysts (such as Benda) who 
look to an Indonesian "identity” in the pre-colonial past are 
searching for something of questionable significance.
Recent studies by Pelzer16 and van der Kroef17 indicate 
that, contrary to Benda’s thesis, important changes have been 
going on in the economic and social structure of rural Indonesia. 
These studies indicate that "in the past century, and in particu­
lar in the last four decades, tenancy, along with the rise of 
a landlord class, has reached alarming proportions in densely 
populated sections of rural Java."18 These changes are greatly 
influencing Javanese social and cultural institutions.19 Insofar 
as these are significant developments, Benda's attempt to return 
to pre-colonial history is bound to be seriously misleading.
The relationship between the colonial period and the present 
Indonesian situation is much more important than even these 
discussions indicate. To see this, we now turn to those analysts 
who have studied present developments from a historical per­
spective .
One of the few efforts to see contemporary Indonesian his­
tory as an integral part of a historical development is that of 
Clifford Geertz.20 His analysis operates on an entirely
16. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Agricultural Foundation," in McVey, 
Indonesia.
17. J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Future," Pacific 
Affairs, 32 (March 1959); "Peasant and Land Reform in 
Indonesian Communism," Journal of Southeast Asian History,
4, No. 1 (March 1963); and "Land Tenure and Social Structure 
in Rural Java," Rural Sociology, 25, No. 4 (December 1960).
18. van der Kroef, "Land Tenure," p. 422.
19. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's Economic Future," p. 60.
20. See: Agricultural Involution: the Process of Ecological
Change in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California,
1966). One other such study is that of J. H. Boeke, Economics 
and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by 
Indonesia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953).
I have neither the time nor space to discuss this latter work. 
For a criticism of the theory as it applies to Indonesia, see 
the Geertz book, pp. 61-62. For a more general criticism 
of "dual" theories see Andrew Gunder Frank, "The Development of 
Underdevelopment," Monthly Review, 18, No. 4 (September 1966).
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different level than those previously discussed. But, not only 
does his analysis highlight the inadequacies of our first group 
of theories of "what went wrong"; in addition, by specifying 
the colonial relationship as the key to the economic development 
of Indonesia, Geertz brings Benda's theory into further doubt.
According to Geertz:
The economy functions much less efficiently but (or, 
more precisely, because) it is the same economy. The 
threefold thematic structure announced by the Company, 
developed by the Culture System, and resolved by the 
Corporate Plantation System— technological dualism, 
regional imbalance, and ecological involution--persists; 
and the frustrations of Indonesian aspirations persist 
with it.21
The influence of Dutch colonialism has been to sacrifice the 
possibilities of Indonesian industrialization in favor of Dutch. 
The discussion implies very strongly that Dutch economic develop­
ment and Indonesian underdevelopment are two sides of the same 
coin. For the Javanese peasant "there was no industrial sector 
into which to move and, as the returns from cultivation went, in 
Furnivall's words, to keep the Netherlands from becoming another 
Portugal, none developed."22 It is purely hypothetical to spec­
ulate on whether Indonesia would have industrialized had the 
Dutch not been present. It is not hypothetical, however, to 
point out that the effect of Dutch involvement was to close 
off any opportunity for development and ensure that the history 
of the Indonesian economy would be one of underdevelopment.
The point to be emphasized here is that the forces gener­
ating underdevelopment did not disappear with the Revolution in 
1949. This is precisely the reason why a correct understanding 
of the entire colonial period is the essential prerequisite for 
an understanding of present problems. In the words of Paul 
Baran:
Indeed the forces that have moulded the fate of the 
backward world still exercise a powerful impact on 
the conditions prevailing at the present time. Their 
forms have changed, their intensities are different 
today; their origin and direction have remained un­
altered. They control now as they have controlled in 
the past the destinies of the underdeveloped capitalist 
countries, and it is the speed with which and the 
processes by which they will be overcome that will
21. Agricultural Involution, p. 125.
22. Ibid., p . 80.
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determine these countries future economic and social
development.2 3
H. 0. Schmitt has suggested a re-interpretation of Indonesian 
politics which, in some important respects, fits in well with 
this thesis. Operating on the premise that politics and economics 
must be united, he has succeeded in explaining some important 
aspects of political instability in terms of the foreign penetra­
tion of the Indonesian economy.
By examining the inflation which has plagued Indonesia since 
independence and by determining its primary victims, Schmitt is 
able to account for the conflict between Java and the Outer 
Islands in terms of "the contrary interests of exporters and 
importers" which "were quickly translated into a conflict 
between geographic regions."2* The analysis takes us a step 
further by associating the exporters and importers with interest 
groups. In terms of economic groups "a bureaucracy in control 
of the state exploited inflationary policies at the expense of 
trading groups."23 45 Here we have a cleavage within the Indonesian 
elite of significantly greater substance than that which forms 
the basis of Feith’s analysis. Not only does it expose the 
superficiality of the "administrator"— "solidarity-maker" 
dichotomy but it also connects the divisions in the elite to 
foreign penetration of the economy and to economic backward­
ness. Schmitt suggests that taxing importers (who benefitted 
by the inflation) was "politically dangerous because of the 
central importance the treatment of importers had in the relations 
between the Indonesian elite and the foreign managerial groups 
that controlled the bulk of the economy. . . . "26
The relation between political instability and the foreign 
domination of the economy goes much deeper. As long as the 
property rights of foreigners were guaranteed, the Indonesian 
political leadership could "not freely dispose of the resources 
of their own country,"27 nor could they mobilize funds to finance 
economic development. An analysis, such as Feithfs, which fails 
to make this fact central will be incapable of answering the 
challenge implicit in SchmittTs argument and made explicit by 
Bruce Glassburner:
23. The Political Economy of Growth, p. 163.
24. H. 0. Schmitt, "Post-colonial Politics: A Suggested Inter­
pretation of the Indonesian Experience, 1950-1958," 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 9, No. 2 
(November 1963), p. 177.
25. Schmitt, "Post-colonial Politics," p. 178.
26. Ibid., p . 180.
27. Ibid. , p. 181.
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Why9 aside from the three almost quixotic attempts 
to deal with financial crises did all cabinets do 
so little in any direction? If they were all na­
tionalists, why did they not vigorously attack the 
vested Dutch interests? Since they all called them­
selves socialists, why was their no vigorous program 
of building of state enterprise? Why when the more 
pragmatic intellectual clique was defeated, was 
there no clear repudiation of their policies and 
marked swing to reflect the polar political swing 
which Herbert Feith finds?28
The answer, as Glassburner suggests (in part), is that given 
the colonial nature of economic relations few alternatives were 
open.
It should be possible now to specify the source of the 
failings of the theories discussed at the beginning of this 
paper. As I pointed out earlier, the approach which asks "what 
went wrong?" is essentially unhistorical in that it denies the 
unity of the present with the past in Indonesia. By fixing our 
attention on the most recent years, it obscures the source of 
todayfs problems in the broader historical development. In 
fact, nothing "went wrong" in Indonesia. Given the colonial 
legacy and the lack of a true social revolution, things could 
hardly have gone any other way.
The root failure of these analysts lies in their inability 
to envision an alternative to economic development as it came 
about in the West and to social structure as it developed in 
Indonesia. This inability manifests itself in various ways.
One is the view of economic development as a purely technical 
or "economic" problem, rather than as a key social issue around 
which opposing social groups muster their forces. In the first 
view, solutions are arrived at through consultations with ex­
perts on the technical problems of building bridges and of in- 
put-output analysis. In the second view solutions are arrived 
at (sometimes violently) through the triumph of one of the 
antagonistic groups. The former view is the essence of Feithfs 
concern over an "administrative" or "problem-solving" elite.29 
When it comes down to this basic point, we find Benda grouped 
with those he criticizes most severely. This is the implica­
tion of his contention that if Indonesia is to modernize (as 
he thinks it will) "'solidarity-making' will be forced to 
yield— or at least make progressively more room for— 'problem-
28. Bruce Glassburner, "Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10, No. 2, pt. 1 
(January 1962), p. 130.
29. Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," particularly pp 
387-388, 395.
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solving.!" The reason for this being that "economic moderniza­
tion, in particular, is bound to follow its peculiar, rational, 
and, indeed, iron logic."30
A somewhat different instance of the view of economic 
development as a purely technical factor is the view that it 
is politically neutral. Thus if we desire to add substance 
to Douglas Paauw's "solution" to the economic difficulties in 
Indonesia, we might be tempted to suggest that if it were not 
for political instability and the resultant drain on funds, 
resources would be released for the financing of economic 
development. We might be further tempted to contend that much 
of this potential capital comes from payments by foreign enter­
prise. The problem with this approach is that it disunites 
political and economic development and "even if partaking of 
the truth with regard to the parts constitutes falsehoods with 
regard to the whole," by severing an historical phenomenon 
"from its inevitable outgrowth."31 Misuse of funds is a result 
of the character of power relationships in Indonesia. In this 
sense it is an outgrowth, or manifestation of social organization 
(or disorganization) rather than the cause of it.
Justus van der Kroef, who takes a position initially opposed 
to the above, ultimately shares this inability to see economic 
development as involving a deep-seated social and political 
transformation. He argues that local social structure has been 
a serious impediment to economic development. But rather than 
realize the necessity of the transformation of social structure 
as a key aspect of economic development he sees the existing 
"variety of social structures and cultural tones . . .  as a 
desirable determinant of economic development."32 Thus economic 
development plans should be better adapted to existing social 
structures.
This perspective contrasts sharply with that which realizes 
the profound social implications of economic development. We 
can do little better than quote Paul Baran on this point:
. . . Economic development has historically always
meant a far-reaching transformation of societies 
economic, social, and political structure, of the 
dominant organization of production, distribution, 
and consumption. Economic development has always 
been propelled by classes and groups interested in
30. "Democracy in Indonesia," p. 455.
31. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, p. 218.
32. J. M. van der Kroef, "Social Structure and Economic Develop­
ment in Indonesia," Social Research, 23 (January 1957),
p. 417.
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a new economic and social order, has always been 
opposed and obstructed by those interested in the 
status quo, rooted in and deriving innumerable 
benefits and habits of thought from the existing 
fabric of society, the prevailing mores, customs, 
and institutions. It has always been marked by more 
or less violent clashes, has proceeded by starts 
and spurts, suffered setbacks and gained new terrain—  
it has never been a smooth, harmonious -process un­
folding placidly over time and space.33
Here, then, is one striking instance of a theory which can 
not transcend the social system it is constructed to explain. 
Theorists of economic development look hopefully to a Western- 
oriented, "responsible," administrative group to accomplish 
development. Just such a group is closest to the interests of 
Western capital and this capital is always seen as indispen- 
sible to development. The trouble is that it has been close 
contact with Western capital which has, in Indonesia, resulted 
in underdevelopment.
This is the relationship traced so well by Geertz. Yet, 
in terms of connecting political events with the underlying 
social and economic forces, his analysis also fails us. He, 
perhaps more than any of the other writers, is unable to 
suggest an alternative to the continuation of these develop­
ments. The involution theme is essentially unhistorical in­
sofar as it fails to encompass possible alternatives to the 
present "ecosystem"; rather it asks: "given an ecosystem . . .
how is it organized?"3 * This approach falls apart if the 
given system contains, as an integral part of it, forces 
which both seek and are capable of accomplishing its trans­
formation. In such cases only an analysis which can itself 
envision the transformation of a social system has. achieved 
a real understanding of that system.
As far as the analysis of Glassburner and Schmitt takes 
us,35 it, too, falls down in this one, all important, respect. 
After having specified foreign economic domination as a major 
source of the political and economic difficulties of post­
independence Indonesia, both fail seriously to propose some 
way in which an end to this domination can come about as the 
first step towards economic development and political stability 
"IndonesiaTs present plight" is, indeed, "the logical
33. The Political Economy of Growth, pp. 3-4.
34. Agricultural Involution, p. 10.
35. This is not to deny differences in the analyses of these 
two. See their exchange in Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, vols. 10, 11 and 12. However they do 
seem to be m  agreement on this point.
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consequence of a particularly unfortunate social structure"-- 
a social structure dominated by foreign enterprise. Yet, while 
Schmitt seems capable of realizing that this "unfortunate social 
structure" results when "an imperial power transfers political 
authority to a former colony without concurrently ceding economic 
power as well,"36 he does not seem ready to suggest an alterna­
tive. Writing in 1963, he suggested that the United States buy 
up and give to Indonesia the various foreign holdings there, but 
this is obviously beyond the realm of the conceivable. What we 
must look to is not the American government turning on its own, 
but social forces in Indonesia capable of taking positive action 
to regain control over the Indonesian economy. However, the 
taking of economic power by "Indonesians" will not, by itself, 
prove sufficient to assure economic growth and social peace. 
Forceful and effective development programs can be accomplished 
only by a party with widespread popular support and organization, 
a party which can, in effect, bring the masses into an active 
role in the reconstruction of Indonesian society.
What is required is a study of the basic structure of 
Indonesian society, of the basic character— the strengths and 
weaknesses--of those social groups which will support such a 
plan of reconstruction, and those which will oppose it. The 
terms employed in many of the foregoing analyses are suggestive 
of the amount of work yet to be done. Up to this point the 
term "elite" has been used uncritically— accurately reflecting 
the use made of the term in most of the literature. It is not 
at all clear, however, that the concept of "elite" (or the 
analogous concept of "mass") provides us with the clarity or 
rigor necessary for an understanding of Indonesian society.
On closer examination the concept, which is quite satisfactory 
for analyzing the outward appearance of power in Indonesia, 
breaks down if we are interested in the underlying basis of 
that power.
The elite, roughly speaking, contains those individuals 
who hold top positions in the official institutions for wield­
ing power--the parliament, cabinet, political parties, and the 
army. By implication power resides in these institutions, and 
is the domain of individuals directly associated with these 
institutions rather than social groups and classes. But the 
correctness of this conception is not at all clear, particularly 
in the light of the rapid decline of these institutions (with 
the exception of the army) after a brief period of predominance. 
One lesson we can learn from more recent history is that, again 
with the exception of the army, real power in Indonesia was not 
exclusively, or even essentially, the domain of the institutions
36. Schmitt, "Foreign Capital and Social Conflict in Indonesia, 
1950-1958," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10, 
No. 3 (April 1962), p. 292.
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officially viewed as the center of power. Real power is asso­
ciated with the making of important decisions and, as Feith 
has shown,37 the Indonesian parliaments and cabinets have been 
largely incapable of decision-making.
The ambiguity of the term elite is particularly striking 
when it is applied to the leadership of the Communist Party.
While considering this leadership a part of the elite may or 
may not clarify something about its relationship with the Party’s 
rank and file, it obscures the relationship of the P.K.I. to 
the other parties and to the political system itself. Insofar 
as the P.K.I. had a basis of power in the support of significant 
social groups and classes (e.g., the urban and rural workers) 
it stood apart from the other parties (see above, p. 7). To 
group the leadership of the P.K.I. with the leadership of the 
nationalist or Moslem parties under the category of elite is to 
obscure basic divisions in Indonesian society, the analysis of 
which may lead to a better understanding of Indonesian politics.38 
To take the point a step further, even the grouping of non- 
Communist leaders under a common heading may gloss over important 
cleavages in this group (such as that suggested by Schmitt) 
and thus be seriously misleading.
As noted at the beginning of this essay, groups outside of 
the elite tend to be given a secondary position in discussions 
of Indonesian politics. These groups may be designated the 
"mass"— a catch-all phrase for everyone not in the elite and, 
therefore, only as meaningful as the term elite from which it 
is derived by exclusion. Here, too, important distinctions are 
obscured. The mass, so defined, includes at least the follow­
ing diverse (and in some cases antagonistic) social groups: 
peasants, tenant farmers, the rural and urban proletariat, 
the rural and urban unemployed, middle-class merchants and 
traders, and, in some cases, small-scale landlords.
This confusion of terminology may have its source in 
recent Indonesian history itself. The nationalist movement, 
by its socially amorphous character, may have encouraged the 
depreciation of basic social divisions. Nationalism was sup­
ported by a variety of diverse social groups and it has taken 
time for the apparent unity of the movement to dissolve in the 
face of resurgent divisions.
37. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 309, 312, 557.
38. Jan Pluvier provides the beginnings of such an analysis.
See his Confrontations (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University, 
1965). His analysis suffers from the fact that he goes 
little deeper into Indonesian social structure than any 
of the others. His own elite-mass dichotomy is somewhat 
more useful but not appreciably less ambiguous.
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In order to understand Indonesian society we need theory 
which operates along two dimensions which are all too often 
neglected. What theory we have sees largely the apparent, or 
surface, dimension. With notable exceptions,39 this theory 
is concerned with the manifestations of deep-seated social 
problems rather than with those problems themselves. More 
viable theory must penetrate first to the basis of political 
and economic instability in the social structure, and second, 
to the historical dimension of contemporary Indonesian problems. 
If we approach present-day Indonesia as a historical phenomenon, 
then two important consequences follow. First, contemporary 
Indonesia cannot be understood in isolation, but only as an 
outgrowth of the accommodation of an indigenous society to 
Western imperialism which has influenced, and continues deeply 
to affect it. The second consequence of viewing the present 
in historical perspective is the necessity of treating 
Indonesian social and economic structure, not as a given within 
which solutions of problems must be sought, but as a historically 
rooted phenomenon the transformation of which will provide the 
only solution to these problems.
39. For example, W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transi­
tion: A Study of Social Change (The Hague: van Hoeve,
1959).
